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Abstract 
Over recent decades income inequality has increased in many developed countries. Although the tax 
and transfer system is the main institutional tool through which income is redistributed, the role it 
played in these changes is often poorly understood. By building a bridge between existing 
approaches, we propose a method allowing for the decomposition of historical changes in various 
income distribution and redistribution measures into (i) the immediate effect of tax-transfer policy 
reforms in the absence of labour supply responses, (ii) the effect of labour supply changes induced 
by these reforms, (iii) the impact of changes in the distribution of other determinants, including the 
effect of employment changes not induced by policy reforms. We illustrate the use of our 
decomposition method by analysing the case of Australia between 1999 and 2007. We find that the 
direct effect of tax-transfer policy reforms accounts for about half of the observed increase in 
income inequality over the period. About one fifth of this direct effect was offset by labour supply 
responses to these policy reforms. Although ageing, increased educational attainments and changes 
in income unit structures played a limited role, we find evidence that the increased dispersion of 
wages and capital incomes substantially increased income inequality. 
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1. Introduction 
Over recent decades income inequality has increased in many developed countries. Fiscal policies 
are the main institutional tools at the disposal of policymakers to address income distribution issues 
but there is mounting evidence that taxes and transfers have become less effective in redistributing 
income (Bastagli et al. 2012, OECD 2011). Yet, there is currently no available tool allowing analysts to 
explore the many potential factors driving income distribution changes while explicitly recognising 
the role played by tax and transfer policies. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap by proposing a 
new unifying decomposition framework. 
Inequality decompositions based on shift-share analyses or on the semi-parametric procedure 
originally proposed in DiNardo et al. (1996) and further developed by Bover (2010) have been widely 
used in the income distribution literature. These methods allow derivation of counterfactual 
distributions that are particularly useful to assess how changes in the distributions of particular 
population characteristics (e.g., age or education) can affect wage and income distributions. 
However, these approaches are essentially descriptive and are silent on the role played by tax-
transfer policy changes. 
Importantly, the mere observation that taxes and transfers have become less effective in 
redistributing income does not necessarily stem from changes in policies. This is because the 
redistributive capacity depends both on the properties of the tax-transfer system and on the shape 
of the distribution of market income to which it is applied. To date, a range of decomposition 
techniques exists to assess the role of fiscal policies in the distribution and redistribution of income 
while controlling for changes in the distribution of market income. Arguably, the main contributions 
are those of Kasten et al. (2004) and Dardanoni and Lambert (2002), where different tax-transfer 
systems are applied to a base distribution of market income that is taken as reference. A known 
limitation of these decomposition methods, however, is that they are only able to capture the 
primary effect of policy changes and miss the secondary effect that these policies have on market 
incomes, in particular that on labour supply. 
In a recent article, Bargain (2012) addresses this limitation by proposing a decomposition based on 
tax-benefit microsimulation techniques. First, he identifies changes in income distribution and 
redistribution measures that are attributable to tax-transfer policy changes directly. Second, he 
draws on a behavioural microsimulation model to evaluate the indirect contribution of policy 
changes through labour supply responses.  
The aim of this paper is to offer a new decomposition method that combines the flexibility of earlier 
counterfactual decomposition methods with the strengths of microsimulation techniques. Unlike the 
decompositions proposed in Bargain (2012) and Kasten et al. (2004), the new decomposition allows 
us to explore the role played by changes in the distributions of a wide range of population 
characteristics. And unlike earlier inequality decompositions, the new method is capable to isolate 
the effects of tax-transfer policy changes. In this sense, we propose a unifying framework to 
understand changes in the distribution and redistribution of income.   
The new decomposition method presented in this paper comprises three layers. The first layer relies 
on a tax-benefit calculator to evaluate the immediate effect of tax-transfer policies. The second (and 
optional) layer is based on a behavioural microsimulation model and allows the analyst to assess the 
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role played by labour supply responses, at both the extensive and intensive margins, induced by 
these reforms. Based on counterfactual methods, the third layer allows the analyst to explore a wide 
range of other factors potentially contributing to the observed changes in income distribution and 
redistribution measures.  
Hence, while isolating the effects of tax-transfer policies, it is possible to assess the role played by 
changes in the distributions of various population characteristics such as age, education or 
household structure. Perhaps more importantly, the method also allows the analyst to assess the 
contributions of changes in the distribution of employment, at both the extensive and intensive 
margins, or in the distributions of capital income and wages. 
Given that labour income constitutes the main source of income for most families and that in many 
tax-transfer systems welfare payments are conditional on meeting low-income criteria, we suggest 
that this third layer is particularly useful to examine how changes in the employment distribution 
affect income distribution and redistribution measures. One novelty of the decomposition presented 
in this paper is that it is capable to identify the contribution of changes at the extensive and 
intensive margins of employment, others than those driven by tax-transfer reforms (and identified in 
the second layer).  
As an illustration, the approach is applied to Australia which, as many other countries, has sustained 
an increase in disposable income inequality accompanied by a reduction in the redistributive effect 
of the tax-transfer system.  
We focus on the period between 1999 and 2007, which was a period of high economic growth 
characterised by important changes in labour force participation rates and in income distribution. 
The results show that the direct effect of tax-transfer policy reforms accounts for about half of the 
observed increase in disposable inequality over the period. About one fifth of this direct effect was 
offset by labour supply responses to these policy reforms. Interestingly, tax-transfer reforms only 
explain about a fifth of the sharp reduction observed in the redistributive effect of the tax-transfer 
system and they are not responsible for the observed reduction in tax progressivity. The main 
contributor to both of these reductions resides in the changes at the extensive and intensive margins 
of employment, and in particular in the increase in employment rates over the period. We also 
examine the contributions of changes in the wage and capital income distributions as well as in the 
distribution of age, of education and of family type and size. Although ageing, increased educational 
attainments and changes in income unit structures played a limited role, we find evidence that the 
increased dispersion of wages and capital incomes substantially increased income inequality. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the decomposition method. Section 3 reports 
results for Australia. Conclusions are discussed in Section 4. 
2. Decomposition approach 
Let M denote the index of interest. This can be any inequality or redistributive measure. The latter 
measures generally involve the comparison of the distributions of market income (g), disposable 
income (d), income taxes (tax), and benefit payments (ben). Let denote this set of variables by  
A={g,d,x,tax,ben} and let  y represent any variable in this set.   
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Let    (      ) be the vector with all relevant information on taxes,     and benefits,   , at time t. 
This includes all rates, thresholds and eligibility rules embedded in the tax-transfer system. Let Pt 
denote the set of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the population in period t. We 
denote by Lt any variable in Pt whose distributional impact is of interest to the analyst. Given its 
important role for the distribution of income, we assume in the following discussion that this 
variable of interest is employment. Thus, vector Lt provides information on employment status at 
both the extensive and intensive margins. The information provided in Lt allows us to divide the 
population into a set of J mutually exclusive categories based on employment status and hours 
worked. The distribution of this variable at time t can be expressed as follows: 
  ( )  ∑    (     ) 
 
   
   ( )            ( ) 
where      is the expectation operator, 1(·) is the indicator function, and j indicates the population 
subgroup as defined by the employment variables in Lt. To evaluate the impact of changes in 
employment between periods t and t+1 on the distribution of y, we estimate the counterfactual 
distribution that would have prevailed in one period had the distribution of employment been that 
of the other period. This technique is used here to obtain descriptive evidence on the link between 
employment choices and income distribution and redistribution measures. For example, the 
counterfactual distribution of y that would be observed at time t assuming employment choices of 
period t+1 is:  
  
   ( )  ∑    (     ) 
 
   
     ( )             ( ) 
The comparison of (4) and (5) provides a simple way to quantify the contribution of employment to 
variations in the distribution of the index of interest.  Similarly, the effect of labour supply can be 
assessed using the distribution for period t+1 that would be observed had the labour supply been 
that of period t. The way in which we combine the information from the two decompositions to 
evaluate the labour supply effect is discussed below. 
To single out the effect of employment changes from those of other determinants we further 
condition the counterfactual estimations on other observable variables. The latter may include any 
other variable in Pt capturing household and individual characteristics such as family type, household 
size, or educational attainment. For a given conditioning variable, X, the conditional distribution is 
given by: 
  
   (   )  ∑    (       ) 
 
   
     (   )          ( ) 
The marginal counterfactual distribution in this case can be expressed as: 
  
   ( )  ∑   
   (   )
 
   
   ( )             ( ) 
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where K represents the number of mutually exclusive categories as defined by the variable X. As 
shown in Bover (2010), by applying the law of iterated expectations one can derive the following 
equivalent expression  
  
   ( )      (   )
     (       )     (   )
   (       )   (   )
           ( ) 
which simplifies to a great extent the estimation of the counterfactual distribution function. 
Assuming that all variables in A= {g,d,x,tax,ben} depend on τ, P, and L, the value of any index, M, at 
time t can be written as 
    (         )  
We are interested in understanding changes in this index between two periods, 0 and 1. Let  
    (        ) denote the value of the redistributive measure in period 1 assuming the 
distribution of employment at both the extensive and intensive margins of period 0. To derive this 
value, we estimate the counterfactual distributions of the variables in A= {g,d,x,tax,ben} required to 
compute the index M using the methods outlined above. The observed changes in M between 
periods 0 and 1 can be then decomposed as follows: 
        
  (        )   (        ) 
                  (        )   (        )            ( ) 
                     (        )   (        )           ( ) 
where the term (6) is the part of the variation in M due to all changes in employment distribution 
whereas (7) represents the part of the change explained by other factors. The contribution of 
employment changes can be further decomposed to identify the specific contribution of the 
variations in labour supply induced by changes in the tax-policy between the two periods. The term 
(6) is broken down into:  
                      (        )   (        )              
                                        (        )   (     
     )             ( )              
                                          (     
     )   (        )            ( )              
where   
   refers to the distribution of labour supply choices that one would observe in period 1 had 
the population of that period believed that the tax-transfer regime was going to be    instead of   . 
 (     
     ) represents the corresponding value of the index of interest.
1 Following Bargain (2012), 
these two elements are derived making use of a behavioural microsimulation model, preferably one 
based on a structural labour supply model. This model is used to estimate labour supply responses at 
                                                          
1
 In the following analysis the vector of tax thresholds, transfer parameters, and incomes, for period 0 is always 
assumed to be adjusted in nominal terms to period 1 values, using an ‘uprating’ factor. The choice of an 
appropriate uprating factor is important, a point to which we come back in the application.  
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both the extensive and intensive margins to changes in tax-transfer policies. The term (8) accounts 
for the contribution of labour supply responses due to changes in τ, whereas (9) represents the 
effect of the changes in employment not explained by modifications in the tax-transfer regime.  
Some caution is needed in interpreting behavioural effects obtained by using such a model. Tax 
microsimulation models are partial equilibrium supply side models. Thus they are able to simulate 
the effect on each individual’s labour supply of a change in the tax-transfer system, but they do not 
allow for demand-side factors or for potential general equilibrium effects on wage rates. In addition, 
tax-transfer policy changes may affect fertility, household formation, migration, educational choice 
and other variables which, in the present approach, become subsumed under the residual 
component of the decomposition. 
The term (7) is the part of the change in M not explained by differences in labour supply between 
periods 0 and 1. This can be decomposed to identify the direct effect of changes in τ: 
   (        )   (        ) 
                       (        )   (        )               (  ) 
                       (        )   (        )               (  ) 
where  (        ) is the value of M assuming that population from period 0 was to face the tax-
transfer regime    from period 1 without being able to adjust their labour supply decisions in 
consequence. The term (11) thus captures the direct effect of a change from the tax-transfer regime 
of period 0,   , to that of period 1,   , in the absence of behavioural responses.  
The term (10) can be seen as a residual capturing the part of the variation in M due to changes in 
other population characteristics. They cover a wide range including changes in the age, occupational, 
educational and demographic structure as well as the effect of non-uniform income growth, for 
instance, by occupation, sector, region or by income source. However, as we illustrate in the 
application, an adaptation of the counterfactual methods used to derive  (        ) in (6) allows 
us to explore the contributions of some of these factors. In essence, instead of considering the 
contribution of changes in the conditional distribution of employment in the term (9), we can 
examine the role played by changes in the distributions of the age structure of the population, of 
educational attainments, of the size and composition of the tax units, of capital income or of wages.  
In summary, using (8) to (11) we can express the variation in the index of interest M between two 
periods as: 
    (        )   (        )         
                           (        )   (     
     )                    (   )                          
   (     
     )   (        )                    ( ) 
  (        )   (        )                         ( ) 
   (        )   (        )                        ( ) 
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where (TLS) is the part of the variation due to changes in labour supply induced by changes in the 
tax-transfer system, (E) is the variation attributed to other changes in employment, (T) is the effect 
of a switch in the tax-transfer regime in the absence of labour supply responses, and (O) is a residual 
that picks up the effect of changes in all other population characteristics. 
Importantly, each of these four components can be computed in alternative ways. For example, the 
effect (T) of a switch in the tax-transfer regime in the absence of labour supply responses can be 
computed using population from period 1 instead of that from period 0. Similarly, the residual term 
that picks up the changes in other population characteristics can be computed using the tax-transfer 
regime of period 1 rather than that of period 0.  
In principle, there are 24 possible decomposition paths. In practice, however, only eight 
decompositions are relevant. Indeed, the O, E, and TLS components must be positioned 
consecutively as they correspond to a split of the initial “other effects” after the effect of a switch in 
the tax-transfer regime (T) is evaluated (see Bargain 2012, p. 713). As there is no particular reason to 
prefer one ceteris paribus condition, it can be argued on the grounds of symmetry that an 
appropriate measure of the effect is obtained by averaging over all possible effects. Following 
Shapley (1953) and Shorrocks (2013), the effect of each component is measured by their arithmetic 
mean values over all possible decompositions (that is, attributing the same probability to each) given 
by: 
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where kk kL L
  .  
3. Empirical application: Australia 1999/00 to 2007/08 
As an illustration of the decomposition method, we analyse the changes in the distribution and 
redistribution of income in Australia between the financial years 1999/00 and 2007/08. The 
following subsection gives more detail about the variables and definitions used in the empirical 
application. We then present the main changes in labour force participation and in income 
distribution that occurred over the period under analysis. The main results from the decomposition 
analysis are presented in the third subsection. In the fourth and final subsection we illustrate the 
flexibility of the approach by exploring other potential contributing factors to the observed trends. 
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3.1 Data sources and definitions 
We use various editions of the Australian Survey of Income and Housing (SIHC).2 This is a nationally 
representative survey designed to collect detailed information on the income sources and the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the households and their members. In particular, the SHICs provide 
rich information on the various components of labour and capital income that we use to generate 
our measure of market income. The values of taxes and benefits are based on calculation of 
entitlements by the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS) described briefly in 
Appendix A, not the actual receipt. MITTS allows the derivation of all major social security transfers, 
family payments, rebates and income taxes, ensuring a reasonable approximation to disposable 
income. 
The unit of analysis throughout is the individual, where each individual in an income unit is assigned 
the total income of the unit per adult equivalent. Following Banks and Johnson (1994) and Jenkins 
and Cowell (1994), the adult equivalent size, s, is obtained using the following parametric scales: 
 a cs n n

    (15) 
where an  and cn are respectively the number of adults and children in the unit,  is the weight 
attached to children and δ represents the extent of economies of scale. The weight attached to 
children, , was set at 0.6 and the economies of scale parameter was set at δ=0.8. These values 
produce scales that are similar to the OECD scales. All the results are aggregated to the population 
level using the household weights provided with SIHC. 
Tax thresholds, transfer parameters, and incomes are all adjusted in nominal terms to 2007/08 
values, using a common ‘uprating’ factor. We use a wage index based on average earnings for full-
time workers provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.3 The index increased by 44 per cent 
during this period. This means that any failure of the tax thresholds or transfer parameters to keep 
up with wage growth is assimilated to a policy choice. For the case of Australia, this means that the 
typically slower growth in benefit payment rates than in wages is attributed to a policy decision. 
3,2 Background 
The 1994-2009 period was a period of high economic growth marked by important changes in the 
distribution of income and in labour force participation (Greenville et al. 2013, Whiteford 2013), as 
well as, policy reforms with a potential impact on the redistributive capacity of taxes and transfers. 
Figure 1 shows the values of the net redistributive effect of taxes and transfers, as measured by the 
Musgrave and Thin (1948) index. This index is equal to the difference in the Gini indices for market 
and disposable incomes (i.e. income after taxes and transfers) for the 1994/95-2009/10 period.4 The 
early 2000s witnessed a sharp decline in the redistributive impact of the tax-transfer system. There 
was a steady decline in the index from 1999 to 2007, year in which the index reached its lowest level 
since 1994.  
                                                          
2
 Commenced in 1994, the SIHC was conducted annually up to 2003/04, except in the years 1998/99 and 
2001/02 in which the survey was not run. From 2003/04 it has been conducted biennially. 
3
 See Australian Bureau of Statistics (cat. no. 6302.0, Table 3, series ID A2734023X). 
4
 Originally conceived to measure the redistributive effect of taxes, this index can be equally used to measure 
the net redistributive effect of taxes and transfers (Lambert, 2001). 
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Figure 1 Redistributive effect of taxes and transfers, 1994/95-2009/10 
 
                         Source: Authors’ calculations based on MITTS and SIHC data. 
As shown in Figure 2, the overall rate of labour force participation among the working-age 
population steadily increased from 80.5 per cent in 1994 to almost 85 per cent in 2007. This rise in 
participation rates was largely driven by females. In particular, the participation rate among females 
in the 45-54 age group increased by more than 10 percentage points between 1994 and 2007 (from 
66 to 77 per cent). 
Important policy reforms were implemented during this period. As regards the income tax, various 
changes were introduced, affecting the total amount of taxes paid and its distribution by income 
groups.5 The income tax rates were substantially cut and the top tax thresholds increased. 
Furthermore various tax offsets, such as the Low Income Tax Offset, were extended to isolate low-
income families from potential bracket-creeping due to the reduction (in real terms) of the tax-free 
threshold.  
Welfare benefits were also subject to important reforms. This period saw the implementation of 
policy reforms clearly aimed at reducing welfare dependency and promoting self-reliance through 
paid work (Goodger and Larose 1999, Australian Senate 2012). The Australians Working Together 
package of 2003 and the 2006 Welfare to Work reform introduced policy initiatives to increase the 
conditionality of welfare payments and to strengthen the incentives to work, which likely 
contributed to the rise in participation rates observed during the period. 
                                                          
5
 For a more detailed discussion of the changes in the Australian tax and transfer system over the period 1994-
2009, see Herault and Azpitarte (2014). 
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Figure 2 Labour force participation rates (25 to 54 years of age) 
 
  Source: Authors’ calculations from SIHC data. 
However, the extent to which these policy reforms contributed to the decline in the net 
redistributive effect of taxes and transfers remains unclear. We make use of the new decomposition 
technique presented above to address this question and to explain changes in income distribution. 
In particular, we apply the decomposition to the years 1999/00 and 2007/08.  
As is clear from Figure 1, these two years mark the start and end of the period of decline in the net 
redistributive effect. Moreover this period has the advantage to avoid distortions from business 
cycle variations as it represents a peak-year to peak-year comparison.6 Table 1 presents summary 
statistics on the distribution of income and estimates of standard redistributive measures. The 
period from 1999/00 to 2007/08 was marked by a reduction in market income inequality as 
measured by the Gini coefficient and an increase in disposable income inequality. The income 
percentile ratios suggest that disposable income inequality increased in part because those at the 
bottom of the distribution failed to keep up with those around the middle. While income differences 
in the upper part of the distribution were slightly reduced, differences in the lower end significantly 
widened as the poorest percentiles fell further behind the median. The decline in the redistributive 
effect of income taxes and transfers was particularly pronounced, dropping by almost 25 per cent 
from 0.22 to 0.16.  
Table 1 also presents estimates of the size and progressivity of taxes and transfers. Tax progressivity 
is measured by the disproportionality index introduced by Kakwani (1977) which is equal to the 
concentration coefficient of income taxes minus the Gini of pre-tax income (i.e., market income plus 
                                                          
6
 Quarterly GDP growth was negative in the fourth quarters of 2000 and 2008 (OECD Quarterly National 
Accounts). 
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transfers).7 The regressivity of transfers is measured using the index proposed in Lambert (2001, p. 
270) defined as the difference between the Gini of market income and the concentration coefficient 
of benefit payments.  
Between 1999/00 and 2007/08, Australia saw a reduction in the average tax rate, defined as income 
tax as a proportion of pre-tax income. Taxes also became less progressive. Similarly, average benefit 
payments declined sharply (even faster than the average tax rate) and they became slightly less 
regressive. 8 The next section examine to what extent these changes were driven by tax-transfer 
policy reforms, by behavioural responses to these reforms and by other factors. 
Table 1 Income distribution and redistribution measures 1999/00 and 2007/08 
 
1999/00 2007/08 
Percentage 
change 
Gini (market income) 0.507 0.471 -7.1 
Gini (disposable income) 0.285 0.304 6.5 
Redistributive effect (RE) 0.221 0.167 -24.5 
Tax progressivity (PG) 0.256 0.237 -7.2 
Transfer regressivity (RG) 1.124 1.086 -3.4 
Average tax rate 0.232 0.209 -10.0 
Average transfer rate 0.151 0.110 -27.1 
Disposable income percentile ratios 
   P90/P10 3.40 3.86 13.5 
P90/P50 2.02 1.94 -4.2 
P50/P10 1.68 1.99 18.5 
                         Source: Authors’ calculations based on MITTS and SIHC data. 
3.3 Decomposition analysis 
The decomposition of the variation in any measure of income distribution or redistribution,   
                  , requires various counterfactual estimates of the index of interest. Concretely, 
for the computation of the contributions of the employment changes, whether induced by policy 
reforms (TLS) or not (E), we first estimate the value of the index that would be observed in one year 
assuming the employment distribution of the other year using the method outlined in the previous 
section.  
For the present illustration we characterize the employment distribution at any point in time using 
three possible categories that distinguish those not working, those working part-time and those 
working full-time (i.e. more than 30 hours per week). This information is then aggregated at the 
income unit level so that each unit is classified according to the number of equivalent part-time jobs 
in the unit (i.e., one for each part-time worker and two for each full-time worker). Given that the 
approach has to be applied at the income unit level, where benefit rates are determined, using 
                                                          
7
 Lambert (1985) shows that, differently to the measures of the redistributive effect, the Kakwani progressivity 
index does not satisfactorily extend to net taxes (defined as transfers received minus taxes paid) as it does not 
satisfactorily account for a mix of positive, negative and zero values. 
8
 The net redistributive effect can be decomposed into the progressivity (or regressivity) index and the average 
rates of taxes and benefits (Lambert, 1985). Larger values of the progressivity (or regressivity) measures and of 
the average rates contribute positively to the net redistributive effect. 
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actual hours worked is not possible in practice as it gives rise to too many combinations for multi-
individual income units. The choice of these three categories to characterize the employment 
distribution is motivated by the fact that little variation was found in the distribution of hours 
worked among full-time and part-time workers over the period of analysis.  
To isolate the effect of employment changes from that of other determinants we condition the 
counterfactual estimations on a set of observables that includes income unit type (couple, couple 
with children, single, lone parent) and unit’s size. We assessed the robustness of the results by 
conditioning on other variables such as the age and education of the head of the unit and by 
applying the approach without conditioning on any attribute. In all cases, we only found a small 
impact on the decomposition results.9 This indicates that the decomposition method is capable of 
accommodating the observed changes in labour supply choices without introducing any significant 
distortions to the population structure.10 
The evaluation of the impact of changes in the tax-transfer regime requires two additional 
counterfactual exercises (see Section 2). To assess the contribution of the changes in labour supply 
induced by policy reforms (TLS), we must simulate the labour supply responses to a change in the 
tax-transfer regime from that of 1999/2000 to that of 2007/08, and vice-versa. These simulations are 
performed using the behavioural component of MITTS, which is based on a structural model of 
labour supply (see Appendix A for more detail). 
Finally, in order to quantify the impact of policy reforms in the absence of labour supply response 
(T), it is necessary to estimate counterfactual distributions assuming that the population of given 
year was to face the tax-transfer regime of the other year without being able to modify their labour 
supply decisions. This counterfactual is derived using the arithmetic tax and benefit calculator 
embedded in MITTS. This component of the simulator uses information on the parameters of the 
tax-transfer system to compute the benefits received and taxes paid by all income units at their 
observed hours of work. 
Table 2 presents the decomposition of the changes in Gini coefficients of market and disposable 
incomes, in the progressivity and redistributive measures as well as in the average tax and transfer 
rates. Interestingly, the results indicate that the observed decline in tax progressivity was not due to 
the changes made to the tax-transfer system between 1999/00 and 2007/08. On the contrary, these 
changes were progressive and contributed to limit the decline in tax progressivity, which would have 
been substantially larger had the tax-transfer system remained unchanged. Indeed, we find that 
keeping the distribution of market income constant following the approach of Kasten et al. (2004), 
the tax-transfer system of 2007/08 exhibits a higher level of tax progressivity than that of 1999/00.  
 
                                                          
9
 Results from these robustness checks are not presented here but are available upon request. 
10
 This is reassuring with respect to the robustness of the approach, especially in view of the fact that 
employment changes were not trivial during the period of analysis. However, it is a result that is specific to this 
particular application. 
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Table 2 Decomposition of changes in income distribution and redistribution between 1999/00 and 2007/08 
  Tax 
progressivity 
(PG) 
Transfer 
regressivity 
(RG) 
Average 
tax rate 
Average 
transfer 
rate 
Redistributive 
effect (RE) 
Gini Disposable income percentile ratios 
 
market 
income 
disposable 
income 
P90/P10 P90/P50 P50/P10 
1999/00 base value 0.256 1.124 0.232 0.151 0.221 0.507 0.285 3.40 2.02 1.68 
1999/00 to 2007/08 change 
          
Relative (in per cent of 
base value) 
-7.2 -3.4 -10.0 -27.1 -24.5 -7.1 6.5 13.5 -4.2 18.5 
Absolute -0.018 -0.038 -0.023 -0.041 -0.055 -0.036 0.019 0.460 -0.085 0.310 
Contributions to historical changes (in per cent)   
 
            
T -86.9 136.6 208.1 -33.7 16.9 0.0 49.6 46.2 22.4 40.1 
TLS 20.0 -0.5 -6.5 17.0 11.5 23.1 -11.0 -3.0 12.9 0.9 
E 64.1 -5.6 -16.5 41.2 29.0 53.6 -18.8 -1.6 57.3 13.3 
O 102.8 -30.6 -85.1 75.5 42.6 23.3 80.1 58.4 7.5 45.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on MITTS and SIHC data 
 Note: T: Tax and transfer policy changes; TLS: labour supply responses to changes in the tax and transfer system; E: other employment changes; O: All other population changes. 
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The observed declined in tax progressivity was caused by variations in market incomes. In particular, 
we find that the decrease in tax progressivity is explained to a large extent by the employment 
changes that occurred over the period, only a small part of which was driven by labour supply 
responses to tax and transfer policy changes. In fact, employment changes, which mainly consisted 
in an increase in employment rates, account for more than 84 per cent (20 plus 64.1) of the 
observed reduction in tax progressivity. These changes contributed to an increase in the proportion 
of tax payers in the population, which in turn reduced the concentration of income taxes.  
Although tax-transfer policy changes are not responsible for the observed decline in tax 
progressivity, they are by far the main contributor to the large decline in the average tax rate. Policy 
reforms alone contributed to a reduction in the average tax rate in the order of 4 percentage points 
(or twice the size the observed reduction). Appendix Table B.1, which presents the income tax 
schedules for both years, clearly shows that income tax rates were substantially cut over the period 
while the top three tax thresholds were increased, leading to a lower average tax rate. This trend 
was reinforced by the extension of various tax offsets, such as the Low Income Tax Offset, which 
ensured that low-income households were essentially isolated from potential bracket-creeping due 
to the reduction (in real terms) of the tax-free threshold.  
The small reduction in transfer regressivity is largely attributable to changes in transfer policies over 
the period. However, the main change with respect to transfers concerns their overall level, which 
dropped by more than 27 per cent (or 4 percentage point as a share of market income). The 
decomposition shows that tax and transfer policy changes alone would have led to an increase in the 
average transfer rate, equivalent in size to a third of the observed reduction. However these policy 
effects were more than offset by other changes affecting the distribution of market income. In 
particular, employment changes are largely responsible for the observed reduction in the average 
transfer rates.  
The increase in labour force participation over the period reduced the reliance on the income 
support system as a source of income. Part of this higher self-reliance through paid-work is directly 
attributable to the changes in the financial incentives built into the new tax-transfer system. Results 
in Table 2 show that this factor accounts for 17 per cent of the observed decline in the average 
transfer rate. However, most of the reduction in the average transfer rate attributable to 
employment changes is due to other factors, which accounted for 41.2 per cent of the observed 
change. Figuring high in the list of these potential factors is likely to be the increased reliance of the 
transfer system on activity-tested payments, the precise impact of which is difficult to measure and 
is not included in the TLS component of the decomposition as this type of reforms does not directly 
alter financial incentives. 
The decomposition of changes in the redistributive effect of the tax-transfer system is a reflection of 
the results discussed above as well as of the changes in the distribution of market income over the 
period. The results show that more than three quarters of the observed reduction in market income 
inequality was due to changes in employment, about a third of which being attributed to labour 
supply responses to tax-transfer policy reforms. In other words, the increase in employment rates 
over the period, part of which was driven by changes in the tax-transfer system, largely explains the 
observed reduction in market income inequality.  
21 
 
However, the decline in the average rates and in the progressivity of the taxes and transfers 
prevented this reduction in market income inequality from translating into a reduction in disposable 
income inequality, which instead increased. Indeed, the decomposition of changes in income 
percentile ratios shows that tax-transfer reforms explain to large extent why the incomes of those at 
the bottom of the distribution failed to keep up with the incomes of the rest of the population. 
Overall, the observed decline in the redistributive effect of the tax-transfer system is attributable for 
one sixth to tax-transfer policy changes, for 11.5 per cent to the labour supply responses to these 
changes, for 29 per cent to other changes in employment and for 45.5 per cent to other population 
changes. The residual term encompasses all effects other than those due to employment and tax-
transfer policy changes. The next section examines the effects of some of these factors. 
3.4 Additional decompositions: an exploration of other factors 
Results from the decomposition suggest that employment changes and policy reforms contributed 
to changes in the distribution of income and in the redistributive effect of taxes and transfers. 
However, the size of the residual component of the decomposition indicates that a non-negligible 
part of these changes is explained by other factors not explicitly considered in the decomposition. By 
simple adaptations of our decomposition, we assess the role of some of these factors. In particular, 
we adapt the third component of the decomposition methods discussed in Section 2 to evaluate the 
contribution of changes in the distribution of age and education (of the income unit head) and in the 
distribution of the population by income unit type (couple, couple with children, single, single with 
children) and income unit size. We also examine the role played by the changes in the wage and 
capital income distributions. For wages, we distinguish twenty groups according to the level of the 
income unit head’s real wage rate for those in work. For capital income, we classify income units 
according to the level of capital income per adult equivalent into 21 groups: units with negative 
capital income, units with no capital income and 19 groups according to the level of capital income 
(in 2007 dollars) for units with positive capital income. For this exercise, counterfactual measures 
derived conditioning on employment status are used to quantify the contribution of each of these 
factors (one at a time) to the (O) term of the decomposition. This is to avoid double-counting of the 
effect of employment changes presented in Table 2. The two other components of the 
decomposition, namely the contributions of policy reforms and of labour supply responses, remain 
unchanged.  
Table 3 presents the results from these decompositions. Although changes in demographics 
contributed to the observed changes in income distribution and redistribution measures (amplifying 
or mitigating the observed trends), their contributions were limited in comparison to the effects of 
tax-transfer policies and employment changes presented in Table 2.  
We note that changes in the age distribution, more specifically the ageing of the Australian 
population under the period of analysis, contributed to mitigate the observed decline in both tax 
progressivity and transfer regressivity. Retirees tend to pay less taxes and to receive larger transfers, 
particularly in the form of pensions, than other age groups.  
Another interesting finding is that the changes in the distribution of the population by income unit 
type and size contributed to an increase in the level of transfer regressivity. The share of couples and 
singles with children decreased and the average income unit size shrank between 1999/00 and 
2007/08. Given that large income units, and especially those with children, tend to be the main 
transfer recipients a reduction in these population subgroups’ size means than transfers became 
more concentrated. 
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Table 3 Additional decomposition results 
  Tax 
progressivity 
(PG) 
Transfer 
regressivity 
(RG) 
Average 
tax rate 
Average 
transfer 
rate 
Redistributive 
effect (RE) 
Gini 
Disposable income percentile 
ratios 
 
market 
income 
disposable 
income 
P90/P10 P90/P50 P50/P10 
1999/00 base value 0.256 1.124 0.232 0.151 0.221 0.507 0.285 3.40 2.02 1.68 
1999/00 to 2007/08 change 
          
Relative (in per cent of base value) -7.2 -3.4 -10.0 -27.1 -24.5 -7.1 6.5 13.5 -4.2 18.5 
Absolute -0.018 -0.038 -0.023 -0.041 -0.055 -0.036 0.019 0.460 -0.085 0.310 
Contributions to historical changes (in per cent) 
  
            
Changes in the age distribution -9.8 -8.2 1.0 -3.4 -3.7 -11.2 10.9 46.2 22.4 40.1 
Changes in education attainments 3.5 -1.3 -4.8 -2.3 -2.0 -8.9 11.3 5.7 -3.7 3.4 
Changes in the distribution of the population 
by income unit type and size 4.1 -11.7 0.6 5.1 2.8 -0.2 8.4 7.8 3.5 6.8 
Changes in the wage distribution 12.1 -14.8 -16.4 5.6 0.6 -9.1 19.5 10.8 13.1 11.3 
Change in the capital income distribution -17.8 -20.5 -32.0 19.7 3.8 -17.3 44.9 6.2 -26.6 -2.1 
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on MITTS and SIHC data 
Note: * Contrary to the results presented in Table 2, contributions do not add up to 100 per cent as each is derived from a different decomposition. 
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Table 3 also shows that changes in wage dispersion led to an increase in both market and disposable 
income inequality. This relates to an observed shift away from the bottom wage brackets to the 
middle wage brackets combined with a growth in the proportion of income units in the top wage 
bracket. This is consistent with the increase in wage inequality documented in Coelli and Borland 
(2014). This trend also contributed to an increase in the average tax rate and a reduction in tax 
progressivity.  
Changes in the distribution of capital income appear to have led to substantial changes in income 
distribution. They contributed to increase both market and disposable income inequality. The main 
change in the distribution of capital income between 1999 and 2007 is an increase the share of tax 
units reporting positive capital income. However, part of this trend may be driven by a better ability 
to capture capital incomes in the 2007 than in the 1999 survey (Wilkins 2014).  
 
4. Conclusions 
Tax-transfer policies are crucial in determining the distribution and redistribution of income. The 
main difficulty in assessing the role of these policies lies in the endogeneity of the market income 
distribution to the tax-transfer system. This is problematic because measures of progressivity and 
redistributive effects of the tax-transfer system themselves depend on the distribution of market 
income. The two existing approaches of Kasten et al. (2004) and of Dardanoni and Lambert (2002) 
are useful to assess the evolution of progressivity and redistributive measures over time, or even to 
make cross-country comparisons. However, they do not explicitly recognise the role of employment 
decisions or the influence of tax policies on these decisions. 
The aim of this paper is to present a new approach allowing for an additive decomposition of the 
observed changes in income distribution and redistribution measures, while fully accounting for and 
measuring the impact of concomitant changes in employment and their consequences in terms of 
market income distribution. Furthermore, we introduce a distinction between employment changes 
directly driven by labour supply responses to tax-transfer reforms and other employment changes. 
This is achieved by combining the method developed by Bargain (2012) with the use of 
counterfactual decomposition techniques proposed in DiNardo et al. (1996) and Bover (2010) to 
generate counterfactual distributions. Furthermore, the flexibility of the approach means that it can 
be used to explore the role played not only by employment changes but also by changes in the 
distributions of a wide range of population characteristics. 
The application of this decomposition to Australia over the 1999-2008 period represents the first 
attempt to describe and understand the recent changes in progressivity and redistributive effects of 
income taxes and cash transfers in this country. The decomposition indicates that employment 
changes played an important role the reduction in market income inequality. This period was also 
marked by a reduction in tax progressivity and in the redistributive effect of the tax-transfer system, 
which are reflected in the increase in disposable income inequality. The decomposition shows that 
tax-transfer reforms accounted for half of the observed increase in disposable income inequality. 
This is despite the fact that tax reforms actually helped limit the reduction in tax progressivity. The 
reductions in tax progressivity and in the redistributive effect of the tax-transfer system were found 
to be driven to a large extent by employment changes, a substantial part of which being attributable 
to labour supply responses to tax-transfer reforms. These results demonstrate the importance of 
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considering employment changes in the analysis of the redistributive effects of tax and transfer 
systems.  
We exploit the flexibility of the decomposition approach to investigate other potential sources of the 
observed changes in income redistribution. We find that although ageing, increased educational 
attainments and changes in income unit structures all played a role, their contributions were limited 
in comparison to the effects of tax-transfer reforms and labour supply changes. The results suggest 
that the increased dispersion of wages and capital incomes played a more substantial role by 
increasing both market and disposable income inequality. 
Finally, it is important to recognise that even though the application presented in this paper draws 
on a behavioural microsimulation model, the approach can also be applied with a simple tax-benefit 
calculator. In this case no distinction can be made between the contributions of labour supply 
changes driven by tax-transfer policy reforms and other employment changes. However, the primary 
effect (i.e., in the absence of behavioural responses) of tax-policy reforms can still be identified. 
Moreover, the role of a variety of determinants such as ageing or changes in household structures 
can be assessed in the same way as illustrated in this paper. 
Appendix 
Appendix A: MITTS: The Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator 
This appendix provides a brief description of the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator 
(MITTS), a behavioural microsimulation model of direct tax and transfers in Australia. Since the first 
version was completed in 2000, and described in Creedy et al. (2002), it has undergone a range of 
substantial developments. For an overview of refereed publications and books relating to the MITTS 
model, see: 
http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/labour/microsimulation/MITTS-publications.html 
MITTS consists of two components. MITTS-A is the arithmetic tax and benefit modelling component 
and provides, using the wage rate of each individual, the budget constraints that are crucial for the 
analysis of behavioural responses to tax changes. For those individuals in the data set who are not 
working, an imputed wage is obtained. MITTS-B examines the effects of any specified tax reform, 
allowing individuals to adjust their labour supply. Behaviour is based on quadratic preference 
functions where the parameters are allowed to vary with individuals' characteristics. Individuals are 
considered as being constrained to select from a discrete set of hours levels. For singles, 11 discrete 
points are distinguished. For couples, a joint set of discrete labour supply points are used. The 
female hours distribution covers a wider range of part-time and full-time hours than the male 
distribution, which is mostly divided between non-participation and full-time work. Therefore, 
women's labour supply is divided into 11 discrete points, whereas men's labour supply is 
represented by just 6 points. The joint labour supply of couples is estimated simultaneously, unlike a 
popular approach in which female labour supply is estimated with the spouse's labour supply taken 
as exogenous. Thus, for couples there are 66 possible joint labour supply combinations. 
Simulations are probabilistic, as utility at each hours level is the sum of a deterministic component 
(depending on hours worked and net income) and a random component. Hence MITTS generates a 
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probability distribution over the discrete hours levels. The self-employed, disabled, students and 
those over 65 have their labour supply fixed at observed hours. Simulations begin by recording the 
discrete hours level for each individual that is closest to the observed hours level. The deterministic 
component of utility is obtained using the parameter estimates of the quadratic preference function. 
To generate the random component, a draw is taken from the distribution of the error term for each 
hours level (an Extreme Value Type I distribution). The utility-maximising hours level is found by 
adding the two components of utility for each hours level and choosing the hours with the highest 
utility. Draws from the error terms are taken conditionally on the observed labour supply; that is, 
they are taken in such a way that the optimal pre-reform labour supply is equal to the actually 
observed labour supply. As a result, post-reform labour supply is simulated conditional on the 
observed pre-reform labour supply. A user-specified number of draws is produced. 
For the post-reform analysis, the new net incomes cause the deterministic component of utility at 
each hours level to change, so using the same set of draws from the calibration stage, a new set of 
optimal hours of work is produced. This gives rise to a probability distribution over the set of 
discrete hours for each individual under the new tax and transfer structure. Rather than using the 
arithmetic mean hours for each individual over the discrete hours available for work, as in Bargain 
(2012), we use the `pseudo distribution' method proposed by Creedy et al. (2006) for dealing with 
the complete distribution. 
Appendix B: Income tax schedules 
Table B.1 Income tax schedules 1999/00 and 2007/08 
1999/00 (uprated) 2007/08 
Threshold Tax rate Threshold Tax rate 
7,785  0 6,000  0 
29,842  0.20 34,000  0.15 
54,783  0.34 80,000  0.30 
72,083  0.43 180,000  0.40 
>72,083 0.47 >180,000 0.45 
Source: Australian Taxation Office 
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